Research Interests
My research revolves around the intersection of corporate governance mechanisms, their functions, and how they influence the strategies and outcomes of businesses.
My research work combines institutional, organizational, and economic viewpoints and mainly focuses on corporate governance and strategy within family businesses and emerging markets. My research interest extends to various aspects of corporate ownership structure and board dynamics, exploring their impact on strategic decisions concerning innovation, corporate finance, sustainable practices, and entrepreneurship.
Current Research Project
My current research project sets out to explore an increasingly pertinent question in the modern corporate world - how can businesses simultaneously champion proactive social and environmental strategies while maintaining robust economic outcomes?
In the contemporary landscape, where emphasis on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) initiatives is growing amongst both business and political leaders, we aim to critically examine the challenges that organizations face in transitioning from a shareholder-focused model to one that embraces stakeholder orientation. Our objective is to deeply understand the complexities of genuine sustainability integration into the corporate sphere and its potential value for all stakeholders.
Our research will investigate the corporate governance mechanisms as key determinants of corporate sustainability and innovation. We believe that a comprehensive understanding of these areas will provide fresh insights into the influence they wield over sustainability strategy and outcomes.
Recent Publications
Corporate Governing in Latin America - The Importance of Scandals to Institute Change
Chapter - Brazil
Co-authors: Dante M. Aldrigui
Palgrave MacMillan, 2023.
QUESTION
How have institutional features and regulatory changes shaped the landscape of corporate governance in Brazil, and what current and future challenges does this corporate governance agenda present?
CONTEXT
In the 1990s, the corporate governance debate had gained considerable traction, both within academic circles and beyond, reflecting the consensus among practitioners and scholars in capital markets that the relentless pursuit of shareholder value was paramount. This debate reached Brazil during a time when publicly traded companies demonstrated a significant bias towards controlling shareholders, prompting several institutional and regulatory changes aimed at protecting investors and encouraging economic exchange and market efficiencies.
INSIGHTS
The chapter offers a comprehensive review of the key institutional features and actors that have significantly influenced the Brazilian corporate governance landscape. It sheds light on how these factors have been instrumental in promoting a shift from the historical bias in favor of controlling shareholders to an improved, more balanced governance framework. The discussion further delves into the pressing challenges that lie ahead for corporate governance in Brazil, making it a critical resource for understanding the dynamic and complex terrain of corporate governance in emerging markets.
Cross-border and domestic minority acquisitions and financial constraints: reaping big benefits from small shareholders.
Co-authors: Lucas Macoris, Aquiles Kalatzis, Dirk Boehe.
Journal: Corporate Governance: An International Review, 31(3), 2023.
QUESTION
Do the motivations of cross-border minority acquisitions differ from those of domestic minority acquisitions?
CONTEXT
To shed light on the potential drivers of cross-border and domestic minority acquisitions, we examine a sample of 11,926 domestic and cross-border minority acquisitions over the period between 2002 and 2014 across 31 countries.
INSIGHTS
We show that the interplay of financing and country-level governance motives is the main driver of such deals in both settings. We find that financially constrained firms are more likely to engage in both domestic and cross-border minority acquisitions, even in the face of higher information asymmetry and transaction costs that international transactions entail. In the wake of either domestic or cross-border deals, financially constrained firms' long-term debt increases; their short-term debt, cash holdings, and equity decrease. The greater likelihood of minority acquisitions of financially constrained firms is explained by the degree of corporate governance institutions in the country in which the targeted firm is based and by differences in levels of creditor and shareholder protections between the home countries of the targeted and acquiring firms involved.
Do internal capital markets in business groups mitigate firms' financial constraints?
Co-authors: Guilherme Kirch, Rafael Matta.
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance, Oct, 2022.
QUESTION
Do internal capital markets in business groups mitigate firms' financial constraints?
CONTEXT
We develop a new rationale for capital allocation in business groups’ internal capital markets.
INSIGHTS
We show that productivity and pledgeable income jointly drive capital allocation within an internal capital market. In financially constrained business groups, an efficient internal capital market can allocate marginal funds to firms that have high pledgeability of income because of a multiplier effect: a dollar of internal funds generates a bigger increase in investment. This result has important implications for the business group affiliation strategy. Whether or not a financially constrained but highly productive firm will benefit from group affiliation depends on its borrowing capacity vis-à-vis other affiliates.
Investment–cash flow sensitivity and investor protection.
Co-authors: Henrique Martins, Eduardo Schiehll, Paulo R. S. Terra.
Journal: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Ago, 2022.
QUESTION
Does country-level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) affect firm investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS)? If so, how?
CONTEXT
Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we examinet the relation between investor protection and ICFS and provide new evidence on how these country-level attributes interact to explain a firm's ICFS.
INSIGHTS
Our results support the argument that overregulation arises when policymakers increase investor protection at levels that lead firms to avoid external sources of finance, hampering firm investment. Our findings suggest that countries face a regulatory trade-off such that increasing investor protection (either shareholder or creditors protection) enhances financial markets efficiency, but excessive regulation can indeed lead to financial markets inefficiencies.